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This paper reviews the arguments as to whether the location of  the securities unit in a 
banking conglomerate should be subject to regulation. This review is  complemented with 
evidence on the regulations and on securities units'  location in the G-10  coun- 
tries and in the.United States before the Glass-Steagall Act. The paper argues that correct- 
ing the safety net's distortions and allowing banks to choose where to locate their securities 
units is a better alternative than retaining such distortions and relying on corporate sepa- 
rateness to limit the problems they may create.  Separateness imposes costs and provides 
banks with insulation that is more apparent than real. However, if  authorities opt for re- 
quiring separateness, a regulation allowing banks to choose between the bank-parent model 
and the holding-company model seems more appropriate than a regulation requiring them 
to adopt either one of  these models. 
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The separation between commercial and investment banking has been a distinct feature of 
the American financial system for decades.  In 1933, reacting to the wave of  bank failures 
that followed the Great Depression, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall  Act, which sepa- 
rated the two industries.  l?&  30 years, bs  on both sides seemed to lack the incentive 
(or the ability) to explore some of the gray areas of  that legislation. Since the 1960s, how- 
ever, commercial banks and securities firms have tried to expand their activities into each 
other's strongholds. These attempts, in conjunction with a more flexible interpretation of 
the existing legislation by the regulatory agencies and the courts, contributed to a gradual 
erosion of  the separating barriers. 
Currently, the agencies charged with regulating and supervising commercial banks-the 
Office of  the Comptroller of  the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and the Federal Reserve System (Fed)-all  agree on easing such barriers further, 
provided that securities activities are housed in a separately incorporated and capitalized 
unit of  the banking conglomerate. They have, however, argued for different regulations on 
the location of  the securities unit in the conglomerate.  The OCC and the FDIC prefer a 
regulation that allows banks to choose between the bank-parent model, in which securities 
activities are offered by  a subsidiary of  the bank, and the holding-company model, in which 
such activities are offered by  a subsidiary of  the holding company that also owns the bank. 
The Fed has expressed its preference for a regulation requiring the holding-company model. 
The difference in the regulatory agencies' proposals has brought increased prominence 
to the debate on the more general question of  whether the location of  the securities unit 
should be subject to regulation. This debate has focused on two general issues one related 
to the economic implications of  different locations for securities units, the other related to 
how  each of  these locations would  affect regulatory agencies' banking constituencies, that 
is, how it would affect the portion of  the banking industry that each agency oversees. 
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location of  the securities unit in a banking conglomerate should be subject to regulation, 
taking into account 1) why commercial banks exist, 2) the problems associated with these 
institutions and the devices adopted to address them, and 3) the potential effects of  com- 
bining commercial and investment banking. This review is complemented with evidence on 
the regulations and on the predominant banking conglomerate models in the GI0  countries 
and in the United States before the Glass-Steagall era. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 briefly presents the potential benefits and costs 
that could result from combining commercial banking with securities services. Section 3 de- 
scribes the alternative conglomerate models that can be adopted to integrate both activities. 
Sections 4 and 5 present evidence on the regulations and predominant banking conglomer- 
ate models in the G-10  countries and in the United States before the Glass-Steagall  Act, 
respectively.  Section 6 discusses the most important advantages and disadvantages of  the 
different conglomerate models, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
2  Commercial Banks in the Securities Business 
In a Arrow-Debreu  world, financial intermediaries are not necessary except for reducing 
transaction costs. The presence of  moral hazard and adverse selection problems, however, 
creates a role for financial intermediaries. They can improve resource allocation, for exam- 
ple, by  offering liquidity services (transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities) or by 
providing monitoring services (acting as delegated monitors of  invest~rs).~ 
Within that setup, it is conjectured that the main gains from combining commercial 
banking with securities activities result from the enhancement of the bank/firm relationship 
made possible by such a combination and from economies of  scope in the production and 
consumption of  financial services. It is also conjectured that such a combination may create 
'For  an extensive review of  the banking literature see, for example, Bhattacharya and Thakor  (1993). 
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2.1  Potential Benefits of Combination 
Firms generally have information about their investment opportunities that is not readily 
available to outsiders. In this case, important savings can be achieved by delegating certain 
functions to financial intermediaries. The costs of  financial intermediation are reduced by 
avoiding duplication of  such functions as .gathering relevant information before making the 
funding decision and monitoring borrowers'  actions once they have received the funds to 
undertake their investment projects. 
Under these circumstances, it is usually believed that an institution that offers both 
commercial banking and securities services can develop a "wider" and "lengthier" relation- 
ship with firms than can a specialized bank. This enhancement of  the bank-firm relationship 
may be a source of  important gains to both parties. 
Increasing the number of  contact points between a bank and a firm gives the bank more 
instruments to consider in the design of financing contracts. It makes it easier for the bank 
to gather information and monitor the borrowing firm, and allows usage of  that information 
in a wider set of  transactions. For example, it will be relatively simple for a bank to study a 
firm with which it has a lending relationship for the purpose of  underwriting its securities. 
The expected length of  the bank-h relationship is also important. Young firms gen- 
erally obtain most of  their funding from banks, but as they mature, they often divert to 
capital markets, a move that in turn requires underwriting services.  Unlike a specialized 
bank, an institution that offers both lending and securities services can fulfill funding needs 
throughout a firm's existence. This fosters a long-term relationship that can provide sig- 
nificant gains to both parties. 1f  the bank and the firm expect to be doing business for a 
long time, then the bank is more willing to invest in gathering information about this firm 
 or a review of these issues see, for example, Santos (1996). 
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firm's upfront capital cost. 
In sum, there seem to be important information advantages associated with offering 
commercial and investment banking activities jointly.  Empirical research on these issues 
is  still in its early stages.  However,  the results already available seem ta confirm that. 
enhancement of  the bank-firm relationship is a source of  significant benefits in cost and 
availability of  funding3 
Another potential advantage of  combining commercial banking with securities activities 
is economies of  scope, which  arise in production when inputs are shared or used jointly. 
Several reasons are frequently given as to  why the combination of commercial and investment 
banking may be the source of  scope economies.  They include 1) the ability to spread the 
fixed cost (in terms of  physical and human capital) of  managing a client relationship over a 
wider set of  products, 2) the possibility of  using the branch network to distribute additional 
products at a low marginal cost, and 3) the ability to face shifts in the demand for products 
more easily because of  the possibility of  shifting resources internally. 
Economies of  scope could also emerge on the consumption side. Because of  lower search 
and monitoring costs, a consumer might find it advantageous to acquire a bundle of  services 
from a single bank instead of  shopping around for individual deals. 
From a theoretical point of  view, there seem to exist a significant number of  important 
sources of  scope economies.  From  an empirical point of  view,  however, the debate over 
the importance of  these economies remains unsettled.  Research on U.S. banks finds little 
evidence of  scope economies in production, but research on banks in Japan and in some 
European countries finds stronger evidence of  these econ~mies.~ 
3Petersen  and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) find empirical support for the claim that bank- 
firm relationships are valuable. 
'For  a survey of  the empirical research on scope economies see, for example, Mudur  (1992), Forestieri 
(1993), and Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993). 
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When commercial bankiig was legally separated from investment banking by Glass-Steagall 
in 1933, backers of  the legislation claimed that they were heading off  serious conflicts of 
interest and threats to the safety and soundness of  the banking industry: These arguments 
are still invoked by those who favor maintaining that separation. 
Conflicts of  interest associated with that combination of  activities are said to emerge for 
several reason. These include 1) the combination of  the bank's advisory role to depositors 
and its promotional role in the investment arena, 2) the possibility that the bank could 
impose tie-in deals by coercing current borrowers to buy its underwriting services or have 
their credit rationed, and 3) the bank's  ability to transfer bankruptcy risk to investors by 
entering into deals whereby it underwrites securities issued by  an insolvent borrower in 
order to rescue a bad loan.5 
The critical issue regarding any potential conflict of  interest is whether the parties have 
incentives and opportunities to exploit it. Working against banks' incentives is the possible 
impact of  such behavior on their reputation, and working against their opportunities are 
competition in financial markets, the requirement to release information, and consumers' 
expected behavior.  If  firms perceive that they may  be  forced into tie-in deals, they can 
protect themselves by  maintaining relationships with several banks.  If  investors believe 
that a bank is "infected" by conflicts of  interest, they can apply a discount to the securities 
underwritten by  the bank.6 
Another frequently cited problem with combining commercial banking and securities 
activities relates to the safety and soundness of  banks.  Negative externalities that may 
--  - 
'For  a discussion of other conflicts of interest see Saunders (1985), Kelly (1985), and Benston (1990). 
6~rnpirical  research on banking conglomerates' securities activities prior to Glass-Steagall failed to find 
evidence that banks systematically exploited conflicts of  interest  (Kroszner and  Rajan  [1994], Ang  and 
Richardson (19941, and Puri [1994, 19961).  An identical conclusion was reached by Gande, Puri, Saunders, 
and Walter (1996) when studying Section 20s' securities activities in recent years. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmresult from  a bank failure continue to be used as a major justification  for making bank 
soundness the subject of regulation. It is often argued that the failure of a bank, particularly 
a big one, may  spread domino-fashion, forcing other banks  (solvent  and insolvent) into 
bankruptcy and creating a system failure. A bank may fail because of insolvency (it may 
not be able to completely diversify the risk of  its assets) or because of  a run on its deposits 
(the provision of  liquidity services leaves the bank susceptible to runs). In most countries, 
the desire to  protect banks from runs, and thus reduce the risk of  a system failure, led to the 
development of  safety nets.7  However, because of  their design and/or because of  the way 
they are operated, these mechanisms create problems of their own. Most notably, they give 
banks an incentive to take excessive risks and they reduce depositors' incentives to monitor 
banks.*  These problems, in turn, have been used to justify  introducing a wide range of 
regulations aimed at limiting banks' incentives and opportunities to undertake too much 
risk. These include capital regulation as well as restrictions on banks7  permitted activities, 
such as the U.S.  prohibition against commercial banks7  entering the securities business. 
Without the distortions created by the safety net, it seems difficult to argue that banks 
should be barred from activities such as underwriting corporate securities, because of  risk 
considerations alone. It appears that the securities business would give banks an additional 
opportunity to diversify, that is, an opportunity to create an alternative source of  revenue 
for  periods of  disintermediation  (when firms sidestep banks and obtain funding directly 
from capital markets). The question thus becomes whether the moral hazard introduced by 
the safety net justifies a regulation prohibiting banks from entering the securities business. 
Some argue that banks should not be allowed into the securities business because this 
would  give them additional instruments to pursue risk-shifting  policies.  Others go even 
7Safety  nets usually include a deposit insurance system, discount window facilities, and a payment system. 
'Schwartz  (1992) discusses the problems associated with the discount window, while Kareken and Wallace 
(1978), Merton  (1977, 1978), and Dothan and Williams (1980), among others, analyze deposit insurance's 
risk-shifting incentives. 
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are those who maintain that measures aimed at reducing the source of  the moral hazard 
directly provide a more appropriate avenue to address the problems that it creates. In their 
view, prohibiting banks'  securities services does nothing to mitigate moral hazard, yet it 
eliminates the possibility of  exploiting the synergies that result from mixing commercial 
and investment banking.g 
3  Alternative Forms of  Integration 
The potential benefits and costs of allowing banking conglomerates to  offer securities services 
depend to a large extent on these organizations' freedom to integrate such services with their 
current businesses.  This integration is greatly influenced by  the conglomerate model they 
adopt. In a deregulated system, there are several models that banks could adopt to integrate 
commercial banking with securities activities. The most common are the universal banking 
model, the bank-parent model, and the holding-company model. 






A  distinct feature of  the universal banking model is that both commercial banking and 
securities activities are conducted within a single corporate entity. As a result, the complete 
'~m~irical  research finds no evidence that securities activities were responsible for the bank failures that 
occurred before the Glass-Steagall Act. For the period after the Act's passage, many studies have attempted 
to evaluate the risk effects to banks and BHCs of  expansion into securities activities. The results are mixed, 
but on balance they appear to disprove the idea that the securities business is highly risky for banks. For a 
review of  this literature see,  for example, Brewer, Fortier, and Pave1 (1989)  and Benston (1990). 
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among the organization's various departments with maximum flexibility. This integration, 
however, may be reduced either because of  existing regulations or because of  management's 
decision to introduce some operational separateness, that is, to separate by firewalls certain 
departments within the conglomerate. 
3.2  Bank-Parent Model 
Commercial Bank 
Securities Subsidiary 
In the bank-parent model, the securities business is undertaken by a subsidiary of  the bank. 
There is a legal separation between the bank and the securities unit, so if  the subsidiary 
fails, limited liability confines the bank's  loss to its investment in the subsidiary.  Legal 
separateness also introduces some operational separateness. As a result, integration of  the 
two activities can be only partially achieved. It may be further limited, as in the universal- 
banking model, either because of  existing regulations or because of  management's decision 
to separate both units operationally. 
3.3  Holding-Company Model 
Holding Company 
I  Commercial Bank  I  Securities Subsidiary I 
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previous model, legal separation-exists  between the two units, thus limiting the integration 
of commercial banking with securities activities. The critical difference between that model 
and the holding-company model is that in the latter the securities subsidiary's capital-and 
everything else associated with its ownership-is  owned by the holding company, while in 
the former it is awned by  the bank itself.  As a result, in the holding-company setup the 
relationship between the bank and the securities subsidiary is only indirect, while in the 
bank-parent setup it is direct. 
4  International Evidence 
International evidence on the conglomerate models that banks are allowed to adopt to inte- 
grate securities activities with commercial banking, together with the model that predomi- 
nates in each country, conveys important insights on the different models.  Table 1  presents 
this information for the GI0  countries. It puts three important results in evidence.1°  First, 
none of  the GI0  countries has regulations completely separating commercial banking from 
the securities business. 
Second, a large majority of  such countries allow banks to engage directly in securities 
underwriting, dealing, and brokering. The most restrictive regulations on the securities unit 
location are found in the United States, followed closely by  Japan and then Canada.  Of 
the remaining countries, banks in Belgium and Italy are required to use an outside unit for 
securities dealing and brokering in stock exchanges, and in France, for securities brokering. 
Third, in countries where banking firms have more latitude to choose where to locate 
''Due  to the level of  aggregation and the details that are specific to each country, table 1 should be seen 
as a synopsis of  the information it contains.  It should also be taken into account that changes may have 
occurred since the time the sources to that table were elaborated.  Despite this, when the comparison is 
possible the information contained in that table generally accords with that presented by  the most recent 
study on this topic, Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997). 
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department of  the bank, that is, they adopt the universal banking model.  When they 
choose to implement corporate separateness, they prefer to offer securities services through 
one of  their subsidiaries, that is, they adopt the bank-parent model.  The United States is 
the only country where the holding-company model is the predominant vehicle adopted to.  - 
integrate commercial banking with securities activities. 
pible  1  I  Banks' Securities Activities in the GI0  Countries:  1 






Evidence on Banking Conglomerates 
Subsidiary  Subsidiary  Subsidiary 
Bank  Bank  Subsidiary 
Bank  Bank  Bank 
Bank  Bankc  Bankc 
Permitted by Regulationa 
Underwriting  Dealing  Brokering 
- 
Subsidiary  Subsidiary  Subsidiary 
Predominant ~odel~ 
Bank-Parent Model 
Universal Banking Model 
Universal Banking Model 
Universal Banking Model 
Bank-Parent Model 
-- 
betherlands I  Bank  Bank  Bank  I Universal Banking Model  I 
I Sweden  I Bank  Bank  Bank  I Bank-Parent Model  I 
I Switzerland  1  Bank  Bank  Bank  I  Universal Banking Model  I 
UK 
Banks may provide a limited number of these activities directly. 
Banks' securities subsidiaries are not allowed to engage in underwriting, dealing, and brokering in equities. 
Affiliate  Affiliate  Bank 
f  The information contained here pertains to statechartered member banks.  These banks are allowed to 
offer  underwriting and dealing services through a subsidiary of  the bank's  holding company on a limited 
basis. National banks and statechartered nonmember banks are allowed to offer certain securities services 
through subsidiaries owned by them. See next section for a detailed presentation of  the U.S.  regulations. 
Bank  Bank  Bank 
Holding-Company Model 
As  a final note, two important caveats should be taken into account when considering 
Bank-Parent Model 
I 
" Source: Koguchi (1993). 
Source: Cumming and Sweet (1987), Edwards and Fischer (1994), Kilgus (1996), and Hoshi (1996). 
For securities dealing and brokering, a subsidiary is required for transactions in stock exchanges. 
the evidence presented  above.  First, factors idiosyncratic to each country may  influence 
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are market imperfections, a certain conglomerate model may piedoxqinate, not because it 
is the most efficient way to integrate particular activities but because it is, for example, the 
best organizational structure to extract rents. 
5  Banks' Securities Activities in the United States 
Throughout American history, the conglomerate models that banks have  chosen for  in- 
tegrating commercial banking with securities activities have  been  greatly influenced by 
regulations.''  Among these regulations, the most iduential appear to have been the Na- 
tional Banking Act of  1864 and the Glass-Steagall  Act enacted in 1933. 
5.1  Before. the Glass-Steagall  Act 
.- .  .  -. 
According to the National Banking Act of  1864, national banks were allowed to exercise 
". .  .  . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of  banking; by 
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of  exchange, and other evidences 
of debt; by  receiving deposits; .  .  . . by  loaning money on personal security; . .  .  ."I2 After 
the passage of  this Act, national banks were at a disadvantage with respect to their main 
competitors-trust  companies and state-chartered banks-because  they could not offer trust 
services and their ability to offer securities services was very limited.13 The Federal Reserve 
Act of  1913 reduced that disadvantage by  authorizing national banks to offer trust services 
through an in-house department. Their ability to offer investment banking services directly, 
however, remained very limited until the enactment of  the McFadden Act in 1927. 
National banks were  never  allowed to invest  in or deal in stocks.  They were,  how- 
"For  a history of investment banking in the United States see, for example, Carosso (1970). 
12see Blair (1994) for a detailed presentation of some regulations on bank powers. 
13White (1984) discusses commercial banks' trust and securities services prior to Glass-Steagall. 
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court decisions open the way  for them to deal in these obligations and invest  in bonds, 
notes, debentures, and other evidences of  debt of  municipalities and corporations.14  De- 
spite not being explicitly allowed to underwrite and deal in debt securities, other than those  .  ' 
of the U.S.  government, there is evidence that national banks did perform these services 
for a number of  years under the "incidental powers"  clause. In 1927, Congress established, 
through the McFadden Act, that national banks were allowed to underwrite and deal in 
"investment securities" that evidence the issuing party's indebtedness and gave the OCC 
the responsibility of  further defining the securities matching that classification. 
Most  national banks entered the securities business  by  establishing an  in-house de- 
partment.  But, as investment banking became more important, particularly in the years 
following World War I, and as competition from less regulated trust companies and state- 
chartered banks increased, they sought ways to compete with these institutions on an equal 
footing. As when they entered the trust business, national banks started developing sepa- 
rately capitalized and incorporated securities units.  These units were generally chartered 
under a state's corporation laws rather than under state banking or trust company laws. As 
a result, they could engage in any type of  financial services not covered by banking and trust 
laws, and they could do so without being subject to capital regulations and supervision. 
In addition, they were free to operate offices throughout their home states and across state 
lines. 
Securities units' ability to operate multiple offices was very attractive to both state and 
national banks, but especially for the latter group. At that time, state regulations prohibited 
state banks from branching across state lines; some states even limited intrastate branching. 
National banks' branching powers started to be defined in 1927 with the McFadden Act, 
but only with the Banking Act of  1933 were their powers made identical to those of the 
14For a detailed analysis of national banks' securities powers see, for example, Peach (1941). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlocal banks in the states where they were located.15 
Securities units were generally operated so as to convey the impression that they were 
very close to their sponsor banks.  Their names resembled these banks';  their main offices 
tended to be located in the same building as their sponsors' main offices; they frequently ben- 
efited from advertising campaigns by their sponsor banks and received loans from them.16 
Securities units were  legally organized so that either their  capital was  controlled or 
owned by their sponsor banks, or else it was owned proportionally by their sponsor banks' 
shareholders. Banks generally chose one the following three organizational forms to  integrate 
their activities with securities services.  In the first and most  common form the bank's 
shareholders received  a pro rata interest in the stock of  the securities unit.  Under this 
arrangement, the shares of  the two entities typically were printed on the same certificate, 
making it impossible to transfer the shares of  one entity without transferring the shares of 
the other. The second form corresponds to the bank-parent model, that is, the capital of 
the securities unit was owned by the bank. Note that, as mentioned above, national banks 
could not promote this organizational structure because they did not have the power to own 
stock directly.  Trust companies and state chartered banks, however, could do so in some 
states. The third form corresponds to the holding-company model. In this case, a holding 
company owned the securities unit and the bank simultaneously. 
The number of national banks and state banks engaged in the securities business (di- 
rectly and through separate units) increased steadily from 1923 to the end of  the 20s, at 
''The  McFadden Act gave national banks the same right as local state banks to branch within the cities 
where they were located.  Soon after 1927, however, states began allowing state banks to branch beyond 
their home cities, thus putting national banks at a disadvantage. The Banking Act ended this disadvantage. 
For a discussion of  branching regulations see Pollard, Passaic, Ellis, and Daly (1988). 
16~anks  were not allowed to  lend any single borrower, including their securities units, more than 10 percent 
of  their capital, but on many occasions they went beyond this limit by developing chain units and lending 
the maximum to each unit. Section 23A of  the Banking Act, passed in 1933, closed this loophole by limiting 
loans to all affiliates to 20 percent of  the bank's capital. 
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and particularly at the beginning of  the 1920s, there were significantly more state banks 
engaged in the secui-ities business than national banks. However, because state banks then 
outnumbered national banks by  more than two to one, the proportion of  national banks 
engaged in the securities business was slightly higher than that of  the state banks. 
" Sources: Banking and Monetary Statistics (1943,  p.  16) for the total number of national and state banks. 
Peach (1941,  p.  83) for  all information on banks involved in the securities business.  The total number 
of  state banks includes state-chartered and mutual savings banks.  The number of  state banks involved in 
securities activities includes state-chartered banks, savings, and loan and trust companies. 
* Numbers in parentheses in these columns indicate the percentage of  total banks that had a national and 
state charter, respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses in these columns indicate the percentage of  total banks with the corresponding 
charter that were engaged in securities business. 
Numbers in parentheses in these columns indicate the percentages of the total banks with the correspond- 









Two aspects put in evidence by  table 2 have particular importance for the subject of 
the current paper.  First, throughout the entire 1923-33  period, there were  always more 
The Number of  National, State Banks, and the Number of  these Banks 
Engaged (Directly or through Separate Units) in the Securities Businessa 
banks (national and state) offering securities services through an in-house department than 
through a separate unit, that is, the majority of  banks preferred to integrate commercial 



























Engaged in the Securities Business 
Totalc  Directlyd Through 
Sep. Unitsd 
95  78  17 
(1.2)  (82.1)  (17.9) 
145  112  33 
(1.8)  (77.2)  (22.8) 
181  121  60 
(2.3)  (66.9)  (33.2) 
235  151  84 
(3.2)  (64.3)  (35.7) 
237  123  114 
(3.7)  (51.9)  (48.1) 
178  102  76 
(3.5)  (57.3)  (42.7) 
Engaged in the Securities Business 
Totalc  Directlyd Through 
Sep. Unitsd 
219  210  9 
(1.0)  (95.9)  (4.1) 
268  254  14 
(1.3)  (94.8)  (5.2) 
312  290  22 
(1.7)  (93.0)  (7-1) 
356  308  48 
(2.1)  (86.5)  (13.5) 
288  230  58 
(2.1)  (79.9)  (20.1) 
201  169  32 
(2.0)  (84.1)  (15.9) 
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preference decreased.  Second, the proportion of  state banks that chose to offer securities 
services through  an in-house  department was  always significantly larger than the corre- 
sponding proportion of  national banks, a difference that may be related to disparities in 
the securities powers and branching capabilities of  these banks. 
Table 2 appears to indicate that the McFadden Act  did not significantly affect  the 
organizational  structure preferred by banks  to  integrate banking with securities services. In 
the case of  state banks, this is explained by  the lack of  any direct influence by that act on 
these banks' securities and branching powers.  The McFadden Act, however, gave national 
banks a potential incentive to bring their securities operations to a department inside the 
bank.  As stated above, this act clarified national banks7 securities powers and gave them 
branching capabilities similar to those of  the state banks where they were located.17  It 
is possible that these incentives were not strong enough to compensate national banks for 
the limitations that they continued to face when offering securities activities in-house. For 
example, unlike state banks, national banks were still not allowed to underwrite and deal 
in equities in-house.  They could, however, offer these services through separate securities 
units, which also had the advantage of being able to operate across state lines.  This, together 
with a significant increase in corporate equities issues (Kroszner, 1996)  in 1927  and in the 
years immediately following, gave national banks an important incentive to continue offering 
securities services through separate units. 
It is possible, on the other hand, that banks preferred to offer securities services through 
separate units because of  the advantages associated with corporate separateness (see the 
next section for a discussion of  these issues).18 
"peach  (1941) and Mote and Kaufman (1989), among others, argue that the McFadden Act mainly gave 
national banks  legal coverage for the securities activities they were already offering, rather than giving them 
new securities powers. 
"Empirical  research on conglomerate models is very  limited.  Two studies of the period before  Glass- 
Steagall produce  opposite results.  Kroszner  and Rajan (1995) conclude that underwriting securities in a 
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choices. The information contained in the number of  state banks, national banks, and secu- 
rities units engaged in securities services would be greatly improved if  it could be matched 
with detailed data on the financial services offered by each entity and with information on 
the organizational structure adopted to operate the securities unit.  ~ata  on these issues; 
however, is very limited or nonexistent. Available statistics indicate that commercial banks 
and their separate securities units captured an increasing share of  the market for underwrit- 
ing and distributing corporate bonds during the 1920s (Peach 1941).  But no breakdown 
of these data is available, for example, on state and national banks, and, within each of 
these groups, on the proportions undertaken in-house or through affiliates. Information on 
banks'  separate securities units is even more scarce, because these entities were  not sub- 
ject  to examination and because they were not required to disclose information on their 
activities. 
5.2  The  Glass-Steagall  Act 
The coincident involvement of  banking conglomerates in the securities business and the 
securities market boom in the 1920s, and the coincident wave of  bank failures and the stock 
market collapse in 1929, led many to believe that securities activities were an important 
cause of  the banking industry's collapse.  This belief,  along with accusations that banks 
had exploited conflicts of  interest related to their securities activities, led to Congressional 
Hearings, which culminated with the enactment of  the Glass-Steagall Act. 
unit outside the bank was helpful in reducing conflicts of  interest. Puri (1996) concludes that underwriting 
securities in-house did not lead to more codiicts of  interest than conducting them in  a separate unit.  A 
possible explanation for the difference in the results is that both studies use the concept of  legal separateness 
rather than that of  corporate separateness, which, as explained in the next section, is more important for 
determining the market's perception of  the "distance" between the banking unit and the securities unit in 
the conglomerate. 
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provided no solid support for concluding either that securities activities were to be blamed 
for the bank failures or that the abuses disclosed in some banks'  practices were common 
to the industry.lg Instead, they relied on anecdotal evidence, most of  it associated with 
the practices of two banking conglomerates-the  National City Bank of  New  York and the 
Chase National Bank-and  their securities units, the National City Company and the Chase 
Securities Corporation, respectively. 
The Banking Act, enacted in 1933, revoked the securities powers granted by  the Mc- 
Fadden Act and severely restricted member banks'  ability to engage directly in securities 
activities and to affiliate themselves with entities that were primarily engaged in such ac- 
tivities. Member banks offering  securities services had until June 16, 1934 to choose either 
to continue accepting deposits or offering securities services, but not both.  Sections 16, 
20, 21, and 32  of  the Banking Act became known as the Glass-Steagall  Act.  Section 16 
limits national banks' investment banking activities to three areas: acting as agents; limited 
purchase for their own  accounts of  certain securities as defined by OCC regulations; and 
dealing in some government ~ecurities.~'  Section 20  prohibits member banks from affilia- 
tion with entities that are "principally engaged" in investment banking activities. Section 
21 makes it illegal for entities that are engaged in investment banking to accept deposits, 
except as permitted by  Section 16.~'  Finally, Section 32  prohibits interlocking directorates 
and certain other relationships between member banks and entities that are "principally 
engaged" in investment banking, except for the limited exemptions allowed by the Fed.22 
lg~or  an analysis of  the events that culminated in the enactment  of  Glass-Steagall  see, for example, 
Carosso (1970) Perkins (1971), and Benston (1990, 1996). 
20~ee  Pollard et al.  for a presentation of  the securities that national banks are allowed to invest in for 
their own account. Section 16 restrictions were extended to state member banks by  12 USC 9355. 
"one  implication of Section 21 was to extend Section 16's prohibitions to  state nonmember banks. Note, 
however, that these banks were free to affiliate themselves with investment banking firms. 
 he  firewalls introduced by Section 32 to separate a bank from its nonbank affiliates were complemented 
with the firewalls introduced by Section 23A. This set of  firewalls was further extended in 1987 by Section 
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The Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act of  1956 and its subsequent amendments did not 
impose further restrictions on the permissible securities activities of  banking conglomei-ates. 
It did, however, close a loophole of  the Banking Act of  1933. According to Section 19(e) of 
. 
the Banking Act, a BHC could not obtain a permit &om the Fed to vote the shares of  a bank 
subsidiary unless it agreed to divest itself within five years of  any interest in a company that 
was "engaged principally" in investment banking activities not allowed to banks (Pollard et 
al.  [1988]). Thus, as long as BHCs did not vote their bank-subsidiary shares, they were not 
subject to the divestiture requirement. The BHC Act closed this loophole by  prohibiting 
BHCs  from owning shares in nonbank corporations other than corporations engaged in 
approved banking-related activitie~.~~  The Fed  was given the authority to allow BHCs to 
engage in nonbanking activities other than those explicitly permitted.24 
In the decades that followed the enactment of  the Glass-Steagall  Act, it appears that 
both commercial and investment banks were willing to accept the separation of  the two 
industries.  In the  1960s, however,  this changed when both sides began  attempting to 
expand their activities into some areas not explicitly closed to them by that Act. Pressured 
in part by these challenges, regulatory agencies started changing the regulations under their 
control in order to accommodate, within the existing law, some of  their constituents' needs. 
It is beyond  the scope of  this paper to present  all the regulatory changes introduced by 
23B of  the Federal Reserve Act was created (Blair [I9941  and Walter [1996]). 
23~hat  act created another loophole because it defined a BHC  as ". .  . any company which directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 25 per centum or more of  the voting shares of  each 
of two or more banks .  . ." The 1970 Amendments to the BHC Act closed this loophole by  reclassifying as 
BHCs companies that owned or controlled only one bank. 
24The  1970 Amendments allow a BHC or its nonbank subsidiaries to engage in any activity that is "closely 
related to banking,"  as long as  its provision of such activity produces expected benefits that outweigh the 
expected costs to the economy. 
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follows, I present the most influential regulatory changes made by  each agency regarding 
banks' securities powers and their choice of  an organizational structure to  integrate banking 
with the new securities activities permitted them. 
The promotion of  the holding-company model and the rulings since the late 1980s al- 
lowing BHCs to offer through a subsidiary a wide range of  "ineligible" activities, that is, 
activities prohibited to the banks themselves by Section 16 of  Glass-Steagall, probably con- 
stitute the Fed's  most important influence in this area.  Since 1987, the Fed has allowed 
BHCs to offer through their s-called  section 20 subsidiaries, such "ineligible" activities as 
underwriting commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and securities backed by  mort- 
gages and consumer receivables.  To insure that these subsidiaries were  not  "principally 
engaged" in the securities business and thus meet Glass-Steagall's  Section 20 requirements, 
the Fed limited the revenue generated by "ineligible" activities to less than 5 percent of the 
subsidiary's total revenue.  In addition, the Fed  imposed a set of  firewalls.  In  1989, that 
revenue limit was increased to 10 percent and the set of  "ineligible" activities allowed to 
section 20  affiliates was extended to include underwriting and dealing in corporate bonds 
and equities, provided that some more stringent firewalls between the bank and the secu- 
rities afFdiate were e~tablished.~~  Finally, in 1996, the Fed announced another increase in 
the revenue limit-to  25 percent-and  dropped some of  the firewalls until then required of 
BHCs with section 20 subsidiaries. 
Like the Fed, the OCC also expanded national banks' securities powers over the years. 
It did so under the "incidental powers"  clause of  the Banking Act of  1864 and under the 
authority granted by  Section 16 of  the Glass-Steagall  Act.  However, the most important 
decision in this area occurred last year when the OCC cleared the way for national banks to 
''A  detailed presentation of  these changes can be found in Pollard et al. (1988) 
26~or  a detailed list of firewalls, see GAO (1995). 
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firewalls separating them from their securities subsidiaries; they will not be dowed to  invest 
or lend more than 10 percent of  their capital to their subsidiaries and their investments in 
these units may not count towards their capital requirements.  . 
Nonmember banks are subject only to Section 21 of Glass-Steagall.  As a result, they are 
free to affiliate themselves with securities firms. In 1984, the FDIC  ruled that it would allow 
banks under its supervision and regulation-insured  nonmember banks-to  offer securities 
services, including underwriting and dealing in corporate securities, through a  "bona fide" 
subsidiary.  The subsidiary, however, had to be distinct and physically separate from the 
parent bank; in addition, its transactions with that bank were subject to some restrictions. 
In 1987, the FDIC amended that regulation, easing the operational separation between the 
bank and its securities subsidiary. Among other things, it dropped the different name or logo 
requirement and the physical separation requirement (Pollard et al.  [1988]). It maintained, 
however, an extensive set of  firewalls between the bank and its securities subsidiary.27 
6  The Location of the Securities Unit in the Conglomerate 
This section discusses the potential impact of  different securities units' locations in banking 
conglomerates. The first of its three parts focuses on the potential advantages and disadvan- 
tages of  corporate separateness.  The second part compares the two organizational models 
most frequently adopted to implement corporate separateness-the  bank-parent model and 
the holding-company model. The third part discusses whether the securities units' location 
in banking conglomerates should be subject to regulation. 
27~~~  (1995) presents the list of  firewalls required by the FDIC. 
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Legal separateness and operational separateness are the two most important determinants 
of corporate separateness. Legal separateness implies that different products are offered by 
separately capitalized and incorporated units of  the conglomerate.  Each unit has its own 
management team, possibly its own board of  directors, its own accounting records, and its 
own capital. Furthermore, limited liability protects each unit's shareholders from any other 
units' losses in case of  failure. Operational separateness results from restrictions separating 
the production of  different products.  Such restrictions generally prohibit the exchange of 
information, personnel, or other inputs among the conglomerate's various units. 
Corporate separateness between banking and securities units is usually believed to be the 
source of important advantages for several reasons. First, it insulates banks-and  through 
them the safety net and the taxpayers-from  the risks of  their securities activities.  This 
advantage stems from the perception that securities activities are riskier than traditional 
banking.  Therefore, it is argued, if banks were to offer securities activities through one of 
their departments, they would increase their risk of  failure and, consequently, expand the 
safety net's liabilities. 
Second, it retains the scope of  the safety net and limits the competitive advantage 
resulting from access to the safety net.  These advantages result from the subsidy said to 
benefit institutions with access to the safety net.  Accordingly, it is argued, if  banks were 
allowed to offer securities services in-house, the safety net coverage would be extended to 
activities that are beyond  traditional banking and that banks would  have a competitive 
advantage over securities firms because they could  use  the safety net subsidy to cross- 
subsidize their securities operations. 
Third, it reduces potential conflicts of  interest that can emerge with the simultaneous 
offering of  banking and securities services. Even though these activities are offered by units 
that are part of  the same conglomerate (and thus subject to common goals and eventually 
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the conflict-of-interest problem.  Separateness allows for the implemeqtation of  mechanisms, 
such as compensation schemes for each unit's management team, aimed at reducing their 
incentives to exploit conflicts (Saunders [1985]),  and it permits the introduction of  firewalls 
explicitly designed to limit management's ability to exploit conflicts. 
Finally, it facilitates regulation and supervision of  banking conglomerates.  Requiring 
banking and securities activities to be offered by  separate units keeps each of  these units 
simpler and thus easier to supervise, and facilitates implementation of  functional regulations 
that are considered less expensive to enforce than institutional regulations (Herring and 
Santomero [1990]). Furthermore, it is argued that corporate separateness permits banks 
to be regulated differently than securities firms.  This is said to be important because of 
differences in the types of  risk faced by  the two entities and because it levels the playing 
field in a system where banking conglomerates coexist with independent securities firms.28 
The effectiveness of  corporate separateness (and, by extension, of  some benefits claimed 
to emerge with it) has been questioned on several grounds.  Most of  the questions raised 
rely on  the fact that despite legal separateness and the existence of  firewalls imposing 
operational separateness between two units of  the conglomerate, the market still does not 
perceive these units to be independent. Several reasons are usually presented to justify the 
market's perception that the units are integrated: First, there are incentives to manage the 
conglomerate as an integrated entity (in order, for example, to exploit scope economies), 
rather than as a portfolio of  independent firms.29 
Second,  conglomerates have  a  strong incentive to protect  their  member  units from 
bankruptcy, even if  it requires them to go beyond  their equity investment in the finan- 
28~errarini  (1995) discusses the differences between banks' prudential regulations and securities firms'. 
 here is some evidence of integrated management in the BHCs in  the United States.  Studies of  these 
companies' operating policies generally yield examples of policies that are centralized at the holding company 
level (see Cornyn, Hanweck, Rhoades, and Rose I19861 for a review of these studies). 
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the organization's reputation and the market's assessment of  it, 2) preserving the reputa- 
tion of the management (Wall [I9841 and Tailey [1985]), and 3) shielding the conglomerate's 
other units from any potential contagion effects resulting from the failure.  of  a member unit. 
(Even with corporate separateness, adverse information resulting from news that a unit 
of the conglomerate is in financial distress may cause a run on the bank that is part of 
the conglomerate, Flannery [1986].~')  Conglomerates' incentive to protect their member 
units is clearly illustrated by  the following statement of  Walter Wriston, former chairman 
of  Citicorp: "It is inconceivable that any major bank would walk away from any subsidiary 
of  its holding company. If  your name is on the door, all of  your capital funds are going to 
be behind it in the real world.  Lawyers can say you have separation, but the marketplace 
is persuasive, and it would not see it that way."32 
Third, the market  may  not view  a conglomerate's units as completely independent, 
despite their being legally separated, because the courts may  "pierce the corporate veil." 
Limited liability does not generally give the creditors of  one unit any claim on the assets of 
any other legally separated unit of  the same conglomerate. However, there are exceptions to 
this rule. For example, in a banking conglomerate, if  the securities unit misled its creditors 
into thinking that they were dealing with the bank, then under certain circumstances, the 
courts may LLpierce  the corporate veil"  and hold the bank liable for the debts of  the securities 
30~ee  FDIC (1987) for several examples in which banking conglomerates helped financially troubled non- 
banking units, some of  which involved bank-sponsored real estate investment trusts in the mid-1970s. 
31~he  most frequently cited example of  internal contagion caused by  a noisy signal are the runs on the 
Beverly Hills National Bank's deposits in 1974. They started when it became public that the bank's parent, 
the Beverly Hills Bancorp, had incurred significant losses in its real estate investment trust. The crisis ended 
with the sale of the troubled bank to the Wells Fargo Bank. See and Cornyn et al.  (1986) for other examples 
of  bank failures involving problems with their nonbank affiliates. 
32~n  the Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of  1981, Hearings on S. 1686, S.  1703, S. 
1720 and S. 1721, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Congress, 
1st Session, Part 11, pp. 589-590. 
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can lead courts to LLpierce  the corporate veil"). 
Finally, the market's perception of  independence among the units belonging to the 
same conglomerate is also iduenced by  conglomerates' policies, including their reporting  .  . 
practices.  For  example, emphasis on consolidated financial reporting will reinforce  the 
integrated entity perception in the marketplace.  Other influences on market perception 
include procedures adopted by the regulatory agencies in charge of  overseeing the banks 
that are part of  conglomerates, particularly if  they give the impression that they oversee 
the financial affairs of  nonbanking units as well as those of  the entire conglomerate.33 
Besides being questioned on all these grounds, corporate separateness is also blamed 
for imposing disadvantages on conglomerates that mix banking with securities services for 
several reasons. First, it requires development and operation of  a more costly organization 
because, for example, of  the cost of  developing and operating an additional separate unit. 
In addition, it reduces scope economies, particularly those involved in the production of 
financial services, and it weakens conglomerates' ability to exploit the synergies resulting 
from their relationships with firms.  These disadvantages emerge mainly as a result of  the 
firewalls that restrict exchange of  information between the conglomerate's banking and the 
securities units. 
Second, it increases agency problems due to the separation of  ownership from control. 
Several reasons are usually presented  to justify  the costs resulting from this separation, 
one of the most frequently cited being the difference between shareholders' objectives and 
management's objectives (such as those arising from differences in the decision horizon). 
Corporate separateness is prone to increase such agency costs, because it separates control, 
that is, it replaces one management team with several, somewhat independent teams. 
Third, it may also be the source of  some new conflicts of  interest. These conflicts may 
33Cornyn  et al. (1986) and Chase (1988) present examples of procedures, currently used by the Fed to su- 
pervise BHCs, which play down separateness and instead promote a consolidated view of these organizations. 
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ownership structures.  For example, if  the banking unit's  capital and the securities unit's 
capital are not owned ratably by the same shareholders, then there will be opportunities, 
such as transference of  assets between the two units, to favor one group of  shareholders at 
the expense of  the other (Edwards [I9791  and Saunders [1985]). 
Finally, it limits banks'  ability to diversify their sources of  revenue because revenue 
generated by securities activities accrues to the securities unit.  Corporate separateness, in 
addition, may introduce incentives for conglomerates to move some operations from banks 
to securities units, thus reducing banks'  assets base.  The conglomerate may find it advan- 
tageous (because, for example, of  differences in regulation and supervision of  its banking 
and securities units) to move some low-risk, profitable activities, such as the underwriting 
of government bonds, from the bank to the securities unit (Eisenbeis [1983])  .34 
6.2  The Bank-Parent Model versus the Holding-Company Model 
Some of  advantages and disadvantages of  corporate separateness, such as potential reduction 
in conflicts of  interest that may emerge with the combination of  commercial and investment 
banking, ability to implement functional regulations and supervision, reduction in scope 
economies, and new  conflicts of  interest that may emerge with separateness, do not seem 
greatly affected by the conglomerate model adopted to implement the separateness. Other 
effects, however, do appear to be dependent on that model. 
The bank-parent model and the holding-company model remain the two organizational 
structures most frequently used to separate banks from securities units within conglomer- 
ates. The critical differences between these models derive from the fact in the former there 
34An  example of this migration of  activities has occurred in the BHCs that have established section 20 
subsidiaries.  Due to the  "ineligible" activities revenue limit, BHCs have  been forced  to move  LLeligible" 
activities, such as the underwriting and trading in U.S.  Treasury securities, from their banking subsidiaries 
to their securities subsidiaries, in order to provide a base of eligible revenue. 
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relationship is only indirect.  In the bank-parent model, the securities unit's capital is an 
asset of  the bank, it's profits accrue to the bank, and, if  it fails, limited liability confines the 
bank's losses to the investment made in that unit. In the holding-company model, because 
the securities unit's capital is an asset of  the holding company, that is, there is a cushion- 
the holding company-between  the bank and the securities unit, all those relationships are 
held with the holding company instead of  the bank. 
As  a result of  these differences, it is usually argued that the holding-company  model 
performs better than the bank-parent model with respect to  the following issues: It insulates 
the bank from problems that may emerge in its sister securities unit, particularly if this unit 
would fail.  It gives the bank less incentive to bail out the securities unit, which is a sister 
affiliate rather than a directly owned subsidiary. It makes the resolution of  a bank failure 
less complicated because in the holding-company model the securities unit's capital is an 
asset of  the holding company not of  the bank.  Thus, in case the bank becomes insolvent, 
such assets need not be considered in the failure resolution procedure. 
In other respects, however, the bank-parent model performs better than the holding- 
company model. It is less expensive to develop and operate because it does not require an 
additional company-the  holding company. It gives the bank more control over its securities 
unit's profits because these can leave the conglomerate as profits only through the bank, 
while in the holding-company model they can sidestep the bank and leaveathe  conglomerate 
through the holding company.  It increases the pool of  assets that the bank's creditors can 
claim, thus reducing bank's incentive to move assets to the securities unit in order to shield 
them from creditors. In the bank-parent model, the securities unit's capital is an asset of 
the bank, while in the holding-company model it is an asset of  the holding company, hence 
beyond the reach of  the bank's creditors.  As  a result, if  a bank gets in financial trouble, 
its creditors can claim the investment in the securities unit if  the conglomerate is organized 
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holding-company 
A final subject of  debate on how  the holding-company model compares to the bank- 
parent model relates to banks'  ability to transfer the subsidy they get from accessing the 
safety net to the securities units. Leaving aside the issue of whether such a subsidy exists and 
how large it is, the many channels that banks can use to transfer it to their conglomerates' 
securities units include three particularly important ones.36 First, banks can transfer the 
subsidy through credit extensions, or the exchange of  information, or the purchase and/or 
sale of  assets and services to/from the securities units in their conglomerates on terms that 
favor these units.  Given that bank's transactions with the securities unit can be equally 
well regulated whether the organizational structure follows the bank-parent model or the 
holding-company model, there seems to be no significant difference between the two models 
regarding bank's ability to transfer the subsidy through that channel. 
Second, banks can transfer the subsidy through capital infusions in the securities units, 
on terms that favor the latter.  In the holding-company  model, this channel is severely 
blocked by the fact that the securities unit's capital is an investment of  the holding company 
and by restrictions on the dividends that the bank can pay to its holding company. In the 
bank-parent model, despite the fact that the securities unit's capital is an investment of  the 
bank, that blockage can also be closely mimicked if  such investment is subtracted from the 
35~egulators  in the United States have attempted to replicate this structure of  claims in the holding- 
company model, through the -called  "source of  strength doctrine. According to  this doctrine, the holding 
company has the duty to provide financial and managerial strength to its banking subsidiary.  It remains 
unclear, however, whether this doctrine can be legally enforced, since the Fed's first attempt to do so was 
unsuccessful. It happened in 1987, when Hawkeye Bancorporation refused to comply with the Fed's order 
to inject 81.2 million in capital into a failing bank subsidiary. The Fed reacted to the refusal by  charging 
Hawkeye with unsafe and unsound practices, but subsequently withdrew that complaint (FDIC (19871). 
36~or  a discussion on the existence of  the safety-net subsidy see, for example, Helfer (1997), Greenspan 
(1997), and Whalen (1996). 
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The last important channel through which the safety net subsidy can be transferred to 
securities units relates to the market perception of  the relationship between these units and 
the banks in their conglomerates.  The stronger the perception that these are .integrated 
organizations, rather than portfolios of  independent firms, the better the chances that the 
subsidy will be transferred. The location of  the securities unit in the conglomerate will affect 
that perception. The closer the securities unit is to  the bank in economic terms, the stronger 
will be the perception that they form an integrated organization. This may contribute to a 
higher transference of  the subsidy in the bank-parent model than in the holding-company 
model. However, this is not the only determinant of  market perception, probably not even 
the most important one. The firewalls defining corporate separateness, the policies adopted 
by conglomerates, as well as supervisory agencies' regulations and practices appear to have 
far more influence on how  the market views the relationship between securities units and 
banks that are legally separated but part of  the same conglomerate. When all these issues 
are taken into account, it is difficult to distinguish the two conglomerate models with respect 
to banks' ability to transfer the safety-net subsidy to securities units. 
6.3  Should the Securities Unit's Location be Regulated? 
Economic theory suggests that in the absence of  special circumstances, such as imperfec- 
tions due to asymmetries of  information, and in the absence of  other distortions, such as 
regulations, the  "invisible hand"  of  the market  will  promote the most  efficient financial 
organizations.  Deviations from this setting may lead to the development and survival of 
the "fattest1'-rather  than the "fittest"---organizations.  Despite this, the burden of  proof 
should be on those who propose restrictions that will interfere with the normal functioning 
of  market forces. 
The decision to regulate the securities unit's  location within  banking conglomerates 
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(the provision of  liquidity and the performance of  monitoring services), 2) the problems as- 
sociated with these intermediaries, (being subject to  runs and failure because of  insolvency), 
3)  the device most frequently adopted to address these problems (the safety net), and 4) 
the impact of such regulation on the potential advantages and disadvantages of  combining 
commercial with investment banking (scope economies, risk considerations, and conflicts of 
interest). 
Were it not for the safety net's distortions, in a competitive market a bank would choose 
the most appropriate conglomerate model to integrate traditional commercial banking ac- 
tivities with securities services by  comparing the advantages and disadvantages of  offering 
securities services in-house with those resulting from offering the services through a sep- 
arately capitalized and incorporated unit.  Because these effects vary with the securities 
activities and with factors intrinsic to each bank (such as reputation), certain banks would 
attempt to minimize some potential problems of  offering the securities in-house by  using 
firewalls to separate the securities department from the rest of  the bank.  Others would 
choose instead to transform firewalls into brick walls and conduct the securities business in 
a separated unit, under either a bank-parent model or a holding-company model.  Under 
these circumstances, given the evidence on the potential contribution of  securities activi- 
ties to a bank's  risk diversification, there seems to be no fundamental justification for  a 
regulation limiting the bank's choices of  where to locate its securities operations. 
Do the distortions created by the safety net justify a regulation requiring securities activ- 
ities to be housed outside the bank? The arguments reviewed here, together with evidence 
on the predominant models used to integrate commercial banking with securities services, 
make a compelling case for answering with a qualified no.  Given that such distortions can 
be  eliminated or greatly reduced (for example, by  requiring market value accounting, by 
introducing more risk sensitive insurance premiums and capital requirements and by adopt- 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfming a prompt corrective action procedure) and given that policies which amplify them can 
also be amended (for example, by committing not to bail out any bank, whatever its size or 
importance), then both should be corrected and banks should have the option of  choosing 
the conglomerate model they find most efficient to integrate both activities. 
This appears far more appropriate than a proposal that takes the safety net's distortions 
as given and uses them to justify  introducing another layer of  distortions, such as those 
that would result from a regulation requiring corporate separateness. This does not appear 
to meet the burden of  proof  required to justify  introducing such a regulation.  The fist 
proposal would  correct the source of  the distortions and would, among other things, give 
banks the opportunity to explore the advantages of  various organizational models (which, 
judging from the diversity of  their choices abroad and in the United States during the era 
before Glass-Steagall, they seem to value). The other alternative-leaving  the distortions in 
place and relying on corporate separateness to confine the problems they cause-limits  the 
synergies of  combining both activities and gives banks an insulation that is more apparent 
than real. 
A regulation that requires corporate separateness limits the choices of  all banks alike, 
regardless of  pertinent factors, such as banks' capitalization, which  determine their risk- 
taking incentives.  In addition, that regulation introduces costs, some of  which  increase 
with  the degree of  separateness-particularly  operational separateness-that  it imposes. 
Given that corporate separateness is the relevant concept, not legal separateness per  se, 
this creates a dilemma.  The stronger the separateness imposed  by  such regulation, the 
stronger the insulation it provides the banking unit but the larger the costs it imposes. At 
the very extreme, if absolute separateness is imposed, nothing is to be gained from allowing 
that combination of activities.  The dilemma is further complicated by  the limitations of 
corporate separateness, particularly those resulting from the fragility of  the firewalls in the 
situation where they are most needed-that  is, under conditions of  financial distress. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmDespite these problems, if regulatory authorities still opt for not correcting the causes 
of the safety net's distortions and use these distortions to justify imposing separateness, 
the question becomes:  Do such distortions justify a regulation requiring either the holding- 
company model or the bank-parent model? This is the question at the center of  the ongoing 
debate among the three U.S.  banking regulatory agencies. They all propose requiring corpo- 
rate separateness, but while the FDIC  and the OCC propose a regulation that gives banks 
the opportunity to choose between the two conglomerate models, the Fed proposes one that 
requires them to  choose only the holding-company model. 
Given that neither of  these models completely dominates the other and given that it 
is possible to design provisions which force each of  these models to mimic the other with 
respect to some relevant  dimensions, there appears to be no sufEciently clear reason for 
requiring one over the other.  To force banking conglomerates to adopt either one of  these 
two models would  be to introduce a regulatory framework that already lags the market 
and that would restrict these institutions' choices even further, thus limiting their ability to 
adjust and compete with other close competitors that are emerging in the financial markets. 
7  Final Remarks 
One issue that has been raised concerning a regulation that would allow banks in the United 
States to choose between the bank-parent model and the holding-company model has to do 
with its potential impact on regulatory agencies' banking constituencies, that is, the portion 
of  the banking industry that each agency supervises and regulates. This issue has emerged 
because the United States has multiple regulatory agencies, each with different powers and 
responsibilities.  Currently, the OCC charters, supervises, and regulates national banks. 
The FDIC insures deposits at commercial banks, manages assets and liabilities of insolvent 
banks,  and supervises and regulates state-chartered banks that are not members of the 
Federal Reserve System. The Fed supervises and regulates state-chartered member banks 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmas well as bank holding companies (BHCs) and their nonbank s~bsidiaries.~~  The Fed is 
also responsible for providing discount-window loans to depository institutions, for running 
the payment system, and for conducting monetary policy. 
Given the agencies' current powers, if  a bank were to offer securities activities through a 
subsidiary that it owns, these activities would be regulated and supervised by the OCC, the 
FDIC, or the Fed, depending on whether the bank were national, a state-chartered nonmem- 
ber, or a state-chartered member, respectively. If  these activities were to be offered through 
a BHC subsidiary, they would be regulated and supervised by the Fed.  These differences 
explain why the constituency issue has become part of  the debate over the securities unit's 
location in banking conglomerates. Some have argued that if  banks were given the opportu- 
nity to choose between the bank-parent model and the holding-company model, most would 
choose the former, and the Fed's banking constituency would consequently be reduced to 
levels that would impair the central bank's ability to meet its responsibilities. For example, 
the Fed has claimed that it needs a "significant and important role as a bank supervisor" 
in order to keep its ability to "manage crises, assure an efficient and safe payment system, 
and conduct monetary policy"  (Greenspan [1997]). 
The central bank's need  for an important regulatory and supervisory role remains an 
unsettled issue, which has been discussed el~ewhere.~'  Leaving that aside and assuming that 
such an association of powers is, in fact, desirable, an important question for future research 
remains.  In a system with multiple regulatory agencies, each having different powers and 
responsibilities, is it possible to sustain such an association of powers  in the absence of 
regulations that limit banks1  choices or the competition among regulatory agencies? 
The supervisory authority of any agency can-and,  if  necessary, should-be  changed 
37~n  addition, the Fed supervises the international activities of U.S. banks and BHCs, and the operations 
of foreign banks in the United States. 
38~or  a discussion of whether the central bank needs supervisory authority in order to conduct monetary 
policy see, for example, Haubrich (1996) 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmby  altering its charter.  Attempting to maintain an agency's  constituency through other 
means, such as requiring a particular location in the conglomerate for the securities unit, 
limits competition among regulatory agencies and may introduce important distortions by 
requiring an inefficient location for that unit.  Adoption of  a regulation requiring banks 
to follow the holding-company model would guarantee the Fed's supervisory authority but 
would limit both banks'  choices and the competition among regulatory agencies.  A more 
appropriate alternative is to combine a regulation that does not limit banks' choices with 
a change in regulatory agencies' supervisory authority in such a way  as to guarantee the 
Fed's supervisory authority. Like the first proposal, this one limits competition among the 
regulatory agencies, but it has the advantage of  letting banks choose between the bank- 
parent model and the holding-company model. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmReferences 
Ang, J. S., and T. Richardson (1994) "The Underpricing Experience of- Commercial Bank 
Affiliates  prior to the Glass-Steagall  Act:  A Reexamination of  Evidence for Passage 
of the Act," Journal of  Banking and Finance 18, pp. 351-395. 
Barth, J. R., D. E. Nolle, and T. N.  Rice (1997) "Commercial Banking Structure, Regula- 
tion, and Performance:  An International Comparison," Comptroller of  the Currency, 
Working Paper No.  7. 
Benston, G. J. (1996) "The Origins and Justification of  the Glass-Steagall  Act,"  in  Uni- 
versal Banking:  Financial System Design Reconsidered, A.  Saunders and I. Walter 
(eds.)  ,  Chicago, Irwin, pp. 31-69. 
Benston, G. J. (1990)  The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass- 
Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidemd, New  York, Oxford University Press. 
Berger, A. N., W. C. Hunter, and S. G. Timme (1993)  "The Efficiency of  Financial Insti- 
tutions:  A Review and Preview of  Research Past, Present, and Future," Journal of 
Banking and Finance 17, pp. 221-249. 
Berger, A. N., and G. F. Udell (1995) "Relationship Lending and Lines of  Credit in Small 
Firm Finance," Journal of  Business 68, pp. 351-381 
Bhattacharya, S., and A. V. Thakor (1993) "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 3, pp. 2-50. 
Black, F., M. H. Miller, and R. A. Posner (1978) "An Approach to the Regulation of  Bank 
Holding Companies," Journal of  Business 5 1, pp. 379-412. 
Blair, C.  E. (1994)  "Bank Powers and the Separation of  Banking from Commerce:  An 
Historical Perspective, FDIC Banking Review 7, pp.28-38. 
Brewer, E. 111,  D. Fortier, and C. Pave1 (1989) "Bank  Risk  from Nonbank  Activities," 
Journal of  International Securities Markets 3, pp.  199-210. 
Carosso, V. P.  (1970) Investment  Banking  in America:  A  History,  Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmChase, S. B. (1988) "Insulating Banks from Risks Run  by Nonbank Affiliates," in Proceed- 
ings of  a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, pp. 291-324. 
Cornyn, A.,  G. Hanwkck,  S. Rhoades, and J. Rose (1986)  "An Analysis of  the Concept 
of  Corporate Separateness in BHC  Regulation from an Economic Perspective," in 
Proceedings of  a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve 
Bank of  Chicago, pp.  174-212. 
Curnming, C.  M., and L.  M.  Sweet  (1987)  "Financial Structure of  the GI0  Countries: 
How does the United States Compare?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Quarterly 
Review, Winter, pp.  14-25. 
Dothan, U., and J. Williams, 1980.  "Banks,  Bankruptcy, and Public Regulation," Journal 
of  Banking and Finance 4, pp.  65-88. 
Edwards, F. R.  (1979) "Banks and Securities Activities:  Legal and Economic Perspectives 
on the Glass-Steagall  Act," in  The Deregulation of  Banking and Securities Activities, 
L. G. Goldberg and L. J. White (eds.), Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, pp. 273- 
294. 
Edwards, J., and K. Fischer (1994) "Banks, Finance and Investment  in Germany," Cam- 
bridge University Press. 
Eisenbeis, R. A. (1983) "How Should Bank Holding Companies be Regulated?"  Economic 
review, Federal Reserve Bank of  Atlanta 68, pp. 42-47. 
FDIC (1987)  "Mandate for  Change:  Restructuring the Banking Industry," Washington 
DC. 
Ferrarini, G. (ed.) (1995) "Prudential Regulations of  Banks and Securities Firms: European 
and International Aspects," London, Kluwer Law International. 
Flannery, M. J. (1986) "Contagious Bank Runs, Financial Structure and Corporate Sepa- 
rateness within a Bank Holding Company," in Proceedings of  a Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of  Chicago, pp. 213-230. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmForestieri, G. (1993) "Economies of  Scale and Scope in the Financial Services Industry: A 
Review of  Recent Literature," in Financial  Conglomerates, Paris, OECD, pp. 63-124. 
Gande,  A.,  M.  Puri, A.  Saunders,  and I. Walter  (1996)  "Bank  Underwriting of  Debt 
Securities: Modern Evidence," Mimeo, New York University. 
General Accounting Office (1995) "Banks' Securities Activities: Oversight ~iffirs  Depend- 
ing on Activity and Regulator," GAO/GGD-95-214. 
Greenspan, A.  (1997) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of  the Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, of  the U.S. House of  Representatives, March 19. 
Haubrich, J. G. (1996) "Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy,"  Federal Re- 
serve Bank of  Cleveland, Economic Commentary, November. 
Helfer, R. (1997) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of  the Committee on Banking and Financial Ser- 
vices, of  the U.S.  House of  Representatives, March 5. 
Herring, R. J., and A. M. Santomero (1990) "The Corporate Structure of  Financial Con- 
glomerates," Journal of Financial Services Research 4, pp. 471-497. 
Hoshi, T. (1996) "Back to the Future:  Universal Banking in Japan," in Universal Banking: 
Financial  System Design  Reconsidered,  A.  Saunders and I. Walter  (eds.), Chicago, 
Irwin, pp. 205-244. 
Kareken, J.  H., and N. Wallace (1978) "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial- 
Equilibrium Exposition," Journal of  Business 51, 413-438. 
Kelly,  E. J. (1985) "Conflicts of  Interest:  A Legal View,"  in  Deregulating  Wall Street: 
Commercial  Bank  Penetration  of the  Corporate Securities  Market,  I. Walter  (ed.), 
New  York, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 231-254. 
Kilgus, E. (1996)  "Universal Banking Abroad:  The Case of  Switzerland," in  Universal 
Banking:  Financial  System Design Reconsidered,  A.  Saunders and I. Walter (eds.), 
Chicago, Irwin, pp.  245-250. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmKoguchi, K. (1993) "Financial Conglomeration," in Financial Conglomerates, Paris, OECD, 
pp.  7-62. 
Kroszner, R. S. (1996) "The Evolution of  Universal Banking and its Regulations in Twenti- 
eth Century America," in Universal Banking:  Financial System Design Reconsidered, 
A. Saunders and I. Walter (eds.), Chicago, Irwin, pp.  70-99. 
Kroszner, R. S., and R. G. Rajan (1995) "Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence 
from Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall  Act,"  National 
Bureau of  Economic Research, Working Paper No.  5256. 
Kroszner, R. S., and R. G. Rajan (1994) "Is the Glass-Steagall  Act Justified? A Study of 
the US  Experience with Universal Banking before 1933," American Economic Review 
84, pp. 810-832. 
Merton, R. C.  (1978)  "On the Costs of Deposit Insurance When There Are Surveillance 
Costs," Journal of  Business 51, pp. 439-452. 
Merton, R.  C.  (1977)  "An  Analytic Derivation of  the Cost of  Deposit Insurance Loan 
Guarantees," Journal of  Banking and Finance 1, pp. 3-11. 
Mote, L. R., and G. G. Kaufman (1989) "Securities Activities of  Commercial Banks:  The 
Current Economic and Legal  Environment," Research  in Financial Services 1, pp. 
223-262. 
Mudur, U. (1992) "Economies of  Scale and Scope in National and Glob4 Banking Markets," 
in The New  European Financial Marketplace, A. Steinherr (ed.), New York, New York 
University Press, pp. 3148. 
Peach, W. N.  (1941)  The Security Afiliates of  National Banks, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Perkins, E. J. (1971) "The Divorce of  Commercial and Investment Banking," Banking Law 
Journal 88, pp. 483-528. 
Petersen, M., and R. Rajan (1994) "The Benefits of  Lending Relationships: Evidence from 
Small Business Data," Journal of  Finance 49, 3-37. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmPollard, A.  M.,  J. G. Passaic, K. H. Ellis, and J. P.  Daly (1988).  "Banking Law in the 
United States," Boston, Butterworth Legal Publishers. 
Puri, M. (1996) "Commercial Banks in Investment Banking: Conflict of Interest or Certi- 
fication Role?"  Journal of  Financial Economics 40, pp.  373401. 
Puri, M.  (1994)  "The Long-Term  Default Performance of  Bank Underwritten  Security 
Issues," Journal of  Banking and Finance 18, pp.  397-418. 
Santos, J. C. (1996) "Commercial Banks Securities Activities: A Review," Federal Reserve 
Bank of  Cleveland, Working Paper 9610. 
Saunders, A.  (1985)  "Conflicts of  Interest:  An  Economic View,"  in Deregulating  Wall 
Street:  Commercial Bank  Penetration of the Corporate Securities Market, I. Walter 
(ed.), John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp.  207-230. 
Schwartz, A. J. (1992) "The Misuse of  the Fed's Discount Window," Federal Reserve Bank 
of  St. Louis, Economic Review, September/October, pp. 58-69. 
Thompson, R. B.  (1991) "Piercing the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical Study," Cornell Law 
review 76, pp.1036-1074. 
Whalen, G. (1996) "The Competitive Implications of Safety Net-Related Subsidies," Mimeo, 
Office of  the Comptroller of  the Currency. 
Wall, L. D. (1984) "Insulating Banks from Nonbank Affiliates," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, Economic Review 69, pp.  18-28. 
Walter, J. R. (1996) "Firewalls," Federal Reserve Bank of  Richmond, Economic Quarterly 
82, pp. 15-39. 
White, E. N.  (1984) "Banking Innovation in the 1920s:  The Growth of  National Banks' 
Financial Services," Business and Economic History 13, pp. 92-104. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm